Crypto Security Now Extends Past the Wallet to the Customer's Address

At around 4 a.m. on September 20, four hooded men broke into a family home in northern France, bound the parents and two children with black tape and forced the father—an IT worker in the crypto sector—to hand over access codes and transfer €40,000 worth of cryptocurrency.

Data leaks fuel physical attacks

Earlier in August, hardware‑wallet maker Trezor disclosed that a breach at a shipping provider exposed order data for more than 80,000 customers. The breach did not compromise private keys, but it linked customers’ names, home addresses and proof of hardware‑wallet ownership.

Security experts say that when a database pairs a physical address with crypto ownership, criminals can locate and coerce victims, as illustrated by the French home invasion.

Rising violence in France

French interior minister Laurent Nuñez reported over 70 crypto‑related violent incidents since January. Chainalysis counted 30 publicly reported cases through mid‑2026, up from 19 in 2025. Home invasions accounted for 37 % of documented attacks by mid‑2026, up from 26 % in 2023, and more than 40 % of incidents targeted a relative rather than the holder.

What data should be retained?

Hacken’s head of GRC, Dmytro Yasmanovych, recommends deleting phone numbers and unlinking delivery addresses once shipments are completed. He stresses the need for verifiable deletion evidence, not just retention policies.

Improving breach response

After the Trezor breach, the company emailed affected customers with details of the exposure, warned of phishing and physical‑security risks, and announced an “Anonymous Delivery” option using locker pickup and unbranded packaging, with automatic deletion of shipping identifiers.

Privacy technology as a partial solution

Zama’s CEO Rand Hindi highlighted fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and zero‑knowledge proofs as ways to keep transaction data confidential while satisfying regulatory requirements. However, these technologies do not protect off‑chain personal data held by suppliers.

Protecting users under coercion

Yasmanovych argues that custody providers should implement mandatory delays, second‑authoriser approvals and real‑time monitoring for large withdrawals, allowing intervention when a user may be acting under duress.

Broader responsibility

The French cases show that crypto security must extend beyond wallet protection to include how customer data is collected, stored, and disclosed. Providers need clear breach communication, evidence of data deletion, and safeguards against forced transactions.