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28 Fear

A Practical Threat Model and Security Guide for TEE Workloads

Original title: Your TEE Workload Is Attested, Now What? A Practical Threat Model for CVMs

Ethereum Foundation 21:39 41 views on YouTube ETH −0.3%

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Summary

Trusted Execution Environments are used in Ethereum infrastructure for block builders, sequencers, coprocessors, and oracles. Every TEE-backed service relies on remote attestation. However, a valid attestation quote provides evidence about the launch state, rather than the runtime state. Igor Grachev presents a practical threat model for confidential workloads using Intel TDX as a concrete example during Devcon. The discussion covers what attestation does not cover, what a malicious cloud operator can observe or manipulate, potential design failures, how securing confidential VM images differs, and a minimum deployment checklist for securing TEE workloads.

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Key points

  1. TEE-backed services in Ethereum infrastructure rely on remote attestation.
  2. A valid attestation quote provides evidence about the launch state, not the runtime state.
  3. Igor Grachev builds a threat model for confidential workloads using Intel TDX as a concrete example.

Questions

What does a valid attestation quote provide evidence about?
It provides evidence about the launch state, not the runtime state.
Who is the speaker for this talk?
Igor Grachev

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